Over the past two years, deep institutional and strategic linkages have been revealed between Pakistan and North Korea, Iran and Libya. Pakistani technology, know-how, and in some cases physical components have been found in each of the three aforementioned nuclear programmes. How has this impacted the global non-proliferation regime, and what have the implications been on security calculations in South Asia? This paper looks at Pakistan’s deep institutional linkages with North Korea, Iran and Libya and examines the deeper crisis in governance in the country. The paper conducts an in-depth analysis of the strategic relationships created between Pakistan and each of the three countries. Issues of technology transfers, quid-pro-quo measures, and joint research initiatives are explored in this section. The paper then assesses the impacts of this proliferation in the context of the growing threat of international terrorism. Considering that networks such as Al Qaeda have openly announced their intentions of procuring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the examples of Pakistani proliferation have taken on added importance. The paper argues that proliferation of nuclear technologies by Pakistan has been an institutional effort, requiring the coordination of a number of national agencies and institutions. The role of the Army in such initiatives is also explored and assessed. The paper concludes with an assessment of the rationale behind the proliferation of nuclear technologies. It is argued that the army remains central to all issues of ‘high politics’ and therefore, nuclear issues remain high on the country’s priority list. It is also suggested that the crisis of identity and governance has also played a big role in the procurement and proliferation of nuclear technologies in Pakistan, and nuclear politics presents the perfect opportunity to divert attention from this growing crisis.