In the initial period of Serbian political transition, when society at large and the state in general are systematically corrupt and when for every economic activity, one has to apply with a government agency to obtain a license or approval, practically every reform process toward liberalization and deregulation of business operations can be considered to be an anti-corruption process.
The fourth chapter in the report on corruption in Serbia 2007 investigates the problems which led to low efficiency of anti-corruption efforts of Serbian governments in the first 5 years of transition to democracy.
The main findings in the chapter are that:
many of the laws or documents meant to be legal basis for direct anti-corruption policy do not contain optimum solutions but just partial comprises among the various interests of parliamentary parties
operative documents, such as strategies, have been formulated not because there were autochthonous political motives for that, but mostly under the pressure of the international community and donors
The main implications of the chapter are as follows:
the greatest weakness of transitional governments in Serbia which makes them unable to fight effectively corruption is that they are coalition governments that is a number of diverse parties participate in them internal stability of those governments depends on a special balance achieved within the coalition, while corruption very often plays a significant role in achieving such a balance
the active participation of powerful multinational European organizations in the formulation of anti-corruption legal documents and programs leads to the inclusion of positions or desires of those organizations, i.e. strategy elements that are better suited to some other countries, particularly those that have a far greater administrative capacity than Serbia
Finally, the authors conclude that only the creation of a powerful government may create a precondition for effective fight against corruption in Serbia.