Interactions between politicians and the military apparatus has largely been an ignored subject in India since independence. However, since the nuclear tests of 1998, there has been a concerted effort to develop a joint operating system of command and control of the nuclear forces, and this has forced a review of the relationship between civilian and military sector. This paper analyses the nature of the relationship, and examines ways of strengthening the efficiency of the command and control system. The paper focuses on developing an understanding of the existing relationship between civilian and military institutions, examining the level of control and influence exerted over the military by the civilian government and its various agencies. This excessive system of civilian interference has resulted in military objectives being compromised, as was witnessed in the Indo-China war in 1962. It is for such reasons that an integrated command and control structure had to be developed, particularly since the introduction of nuclear weapons irrevocably altered the security calculus of the region. The author discusses the issue of competence to engage with strategic planning, arguing that the military is the only body capable of making decisions in such matters. Given its experience and expertise, the author suggests that the lead role in developing core competencies in strategic issues such as targeting and deployment ought to rest with the military. The paper concludes with an example of where the military apparatus has been allowed to engage with the issue of insurgency operations, and utilises its methodology to argue that on certain issues, it is better to have a clear separation of powers - particularly if the objectives are strategic in nature.